

*Security Provision in Slum Re-  
Settlement Schemes in Mumbai-  
A Case Study of the Lallubhai  
Compound Settlement, Mankhurd*

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As mega-cities become 'mega-regions' (as characterised in Brugmann 2009) large numbers of people are being displaced within cities. There are multiple layers at which this displacement finds impetus, including economic gentrification, ghettoisation of neighbourhoods, ethnic violence, as well as large scale infrastructure projects which aim to westernise cities of the global south. The scale of such displacement is immense- for example, two recent World Bank funded infrastructure projects in Mumbai (the Mumbai Urban Transport Project and the Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project) are together slated to displace approximately 275,000 people from within city limits. These people are being displaced from areas classified as inner city slums and informal settlements and being relocated to a few concentrated low-income housing projects in the fringes of the city. It is most poignant that not only is the relocation process protracted and extremely violent, but also the relocation sites are also becoming sites of concentrated violence, vulnerability and crime, heightening the multiplier effects of the intergenerational transfer of vulnerability and poverty. Evidence on the ethnic gentrification of these relocation sites is also beginning to emerge, perhaps showcasing how those who have 'banded together' under a socio-religious/ethnic banner have managed to secure themselves better against vulnerability.

The dominant discourse seems to view slum dwellers and particularly recent (rural) migrants to the city at best as 'outsiders' or a menace, or at worst, as impediments to urban development - that is, their presence is debilitating to the greater common good. In order to make way for large scale infrastructure building, renewal or upgrading projects, Mumbai city

authorities have planned to relocate and re-house between 5 and 9 million slum dwellers to make Mumbai a 'modern city' in the next 20 years, while other metros are also pursuing similar strategies. In practice, much less thought is being given to what a 'slum' is, and what it means to be a 'slum dweller', or that both these concepts might actually be centred around an extremely productive, albeit informal, livelihood.

### Focus of study

The ramification of a vast relocation exercise, such as the ones being planned and underway in Mumbai, on insecurity and vulnerability are extreme. An important set of questions arise: should security provision be an explicit part of slum relocation and redevelopment schemes? And if so, how and to what extent? Framing these questions in this manner closely aligns them to the literature on the development-lead forced displaced or 'development-induced oustees'



(c.f. Cernea 1993; Gupte and Mehta 2007). This study takes up these questions in relation to slum resettlements schemes of the Mumbai Urban Transport Project and the Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project, and in particular, focuses on one resettlement site in Mankhurd. The research for this study was carried out over nine months in 2009, using Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), household, semi-structured and key informant interviews as well as GIS mapping and analysis.

### **Urban insecurity and vulnerability of the urban dispossessed**

It is important to highlight at the outset then that the policies, programs and schemes looked at in this study cater to development induced oustees (simply 'oustees' hereafter), and therefore need to be differentiated from policies and programs which deal with the provision of low-income housing. This is primarily because the rights and responsibilities structures are very different between the two. Slum relocation, resettlement and rehabilitation policies and programs cater not only to the urban dispossessed, but more poignantly, to those who have also been displaced from their informal habitat as a direct consequence of the government's development policies. Since there often is an element at best of compulsory relocation or at worst of slum-demolition and forced eviction in such schemes (c.f. Bhide 2008), the government therefore must also bear the direct responsibilities for the relocation, resettlement, and rehabilitation of the project affected. Furthermore, "large-scale development interventions are often associated with major change in land and water use as well as mandatory population dislocation and resettlement" (Contractor 2008).

On the other hand, low-income housing provision schemes are incentive and market based solutions to ease demand pressures on an insufficient housing stock, and represent voluntary population movements of people willingly pursuing new opportunities of employment and livelihood. While the issue of unaffordable or unavailable housing is inevitably related to the growth of the informal housing sector, the rights and responsibilities structures governing affordable housing schemes, which people opt into voluntarily, are wholly different from those governing slum resettlement schemes. This difference is recognised by the central and state governments in that the mandated responsibilities for the two fall under the purview of separate civic bodies. While the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) is an apex public body established in 1977 under Housing Department Government of Maharashtra and integrated the activities and functions performed by statutory bodies to provide comprehensive, co-ordinate approach to the problems of housing (MHADA ACT 1976), the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA), established in 1995, serves as the planning authority for all slum areas in Greater Mumbai and to facilitate the rehabilitation of slum dwellers into authorised dwelling units.

Recent studies have highlighted that current policy frameworks tend to view insecurity as a one-dimensional function of tenure (see Bhide 2009), and have failed to incorporate specific thinking around the multi-dimensionality of urban vulnerability, insecurity and poverty. This failure can be attributed primarily to the divergence in the understanding of tenure and citizen rights from the perspective of the State vis-à-vis the communities which live in informal housing. Bhide clarifies this divergence by pointing out that "while the State and other








dominant approaches link tenure to land; tenure is important for the poor as part of a right to be in the city. The city represents a contradictory terrain that affords livelihood opportunities but denies any legal access to reside. The prevalent tussles between people and State are reflective of this dichotomy” (Bhide 2009: 4).

That is, on one hand, the dominant discourse, and as a consequence the State’s actions hitherto, equate land tenure with security (World Bank 2001). The argument is that security for the urban poor is dependant on having legal recognition to the use of property, the freedom to trade and collateralise land, and the acquisition of infrastructure services with minimal transactions costs. Therefore, the provision of legal tenure - that is the legal/ formal right to a concretised/permanent living space- is seen as the necessary and sufficient component of security for the urban poor who live in informal housing. However, as Bhide points out, “for the urban poor, tenure is a part of an overall right to city that includes access to education, health, food, water, toilets, work, being part of voter lists and shelter. Several studies in fact, show that the topmost priorities of the poor revolve around work, food and other matters of survival” (Bhide 2009:4).

As can be seen in the adjoining figure, urban vulnerability of those living in informal settlements has several dimensions to it, comprising of inadequate income/ consumption, inadequate public service provision, a limited or non-existent asset base, as well as inadequate protection from and by the law and the presence of physical insecurity (as in Baulch 1996). This therefore makes it clear that while the provision of formal tenure through a slum resettlement scheme addresses

the issues of a limited asset base by transferring legal ownership of living space, it does not mitigate a multidimensional conceptualisation of vulnerability in its entirety. On the contrary, some studies have shown that such a system of tenure creates more contestation and vulnerability by creating more administrative hurdles to access services (see Bhide 2008; Bhide 2009). As will be showcased in the following sections, out of the respondents from the Lallubhai Compound, most households could be categorised as being in the fourth, or bottom-most, layer of vulnerability, since they received very low levels of public service provision (inadequate running water, sanitation, health and schooling services), had next to no savings (but did have ownership of their living tenements), and could be considered as having inadequate protection from/by the law<sup>1</sup>.



*Vulnerability pyramid. Source: Adapted from Baulch 2006*

## The MUTP and Resettlement & Rehabilitation

In 2002, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA) approved a loan and credit line for the USD 945 million Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP), out of which the Government of India was to put forth USD 403 million. The MUTP is a major infrastructure project that entails resettlement of over 120,000 people


and the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) was the civic body made responsible for the Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R) for these Project Affected Persons (PAPs). As per project documentation, the development objective of the MUDP is to facilitate urban economic growth and improve the quality of life of the citizens of Mumbai by developing an efficient and sustainable urban transport system, including effective institutions, to meet the needs of users in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR). In 2004, an IBRD review panel rated the safeguard management performance as unsatisfactory due to delays in completing the post resettlement activities for those already residing in permanent housing, as well as delays by local authorities in completion of offsite infrastructure facilities (water supply, drainage, storm

water drainage, access roads), serving the already constructed housing at the resettlement sites (see IBRD Inspection Panel 2004). As a result of this review process the IBRD loan was suspended.

### **The Lallubhai Compound, Mankhurd**

#### ***Description of study site:***

In the project documentation, it is recognised that the resettlement is a crucial factor for successful implementation of the MUDP. The World Bank and the Government of Maharashtra spent many years on the design of the R&R component. Through a Policy and Human Resources Development grant (PHRD) of USD 720,000, from the Government of Japan, the Bank provided support for resettlement preparation activities. This was used for baseline surveys, institutional studies, resettlement planning and support of individual




Map 1- Deonar, Mankhurd, Govandi (credit\_ Paul Heller)



consultants and experts. Out of the 120,000 PAPs, the largest concentration of Project Affected Households (PAHs) in any one resettlement site, numbering 6000, that is, approximately 35,000 PAPs, were planned to be allotted a 225 sq.ft. tenement per PAH in 72 five to seven storey towers in Mankhurd, which is in Mumbai's M ward.

In this study I focused primarily on the 19 of 72 buildings which were built by S.V. Patel. However, other towers built by Hiranandani were also included in the study (see Maps 1 & 2 for more details on the study site). The S.V. Patel buildings have a Ground-plus-five-storeys structure, with a terrace above the fifth floor. Each building has 24 tenements on each floor—the ground floor has one central corridor connecting all 24 tenements, but on higher floors the corridor is broken by a central

shaft, and two separate staircases give access to 12 tenements on either side of it. Each tenement is 225 sq.ft. and is broken into a bedroom, lounge area, kitchen area, a toilet and separate bathing area. These 19 buildings are built in a 2 hectares block (allowing for a perimeter 1 meter away from the outer buildings and including all pathways in between), with alternate buildings facing each other. The pathways into which the central buildings open out are approximately 3 meters wide, while the pathways which are in-between or behind adjacent buildings are narrower. Because of the closeness of the buildings, the entire group of 19 buildings can almost be viewed as one compact block, with 456 tenements on each floor and 2,736 tenements in total. While some tenements are used as community offices and Public Information Centres, taking an approximate



Map 2- Lallubhai Compound (credit\_ Paul Heller)



household size of five, the block houses 13,680 PAPs, this gives a project population density of 720,000 people per sq.km.

### **Multidimensional vulnerability at the Lallubhai Compound:**

The Mankhurd site, which has now come to be known as the Lallubhai Compound, was selected through a competitive open process which invited several proposals from land owners and developers and graded these on a 20 point evaluation system<sup>2</sup>. As per World Bank documentation, the site did achieve a high grading through this system, and was selected above eleven other sites. However, several environmental, social, and economic concerns have now come to the fore, and reached critical importance for the sustainability of the resettlement at Lallubhai. These also showcase important lessons to be incorporated into future resettlement schemes.

### **Issues of vulnerability in Lallubhai**

#### ***1. Physical safety and security: design, layout & access***

There are several concerns of physical safety and security which arise out of the manner in which the resettlement site has been designed and its layout. The most obvious concern is that because the widest access route to the inner buildings is roughly 3 meters wide when completely clear of debris, stalls, stored items etc, in the event of a fire, fire trucks will not be able to access them. Even getting to the compound is difficult and convoluted since there is no direct access to the site from the main roads around its perimeter (see Map 1). It is poignant to point out that even though there are two major expressway roads directly to the North and South of the site, there is no direct access from these into the site. The main road entrance into the site is through the Deonar Municipal Colony

and over a narrow makeshift bridge on the outflow canal from the Deonar abattoir directly West of the Compound. There is a major dual-carriageway from Mohite Patil Nagar to Sate Nagar, but this stops roughly 100 meters short of the Lallubhai compound and becomes a narrow foot-bridge over the canal system South East of the Compound. All other access routes (to Mankhurd train station to the South or to Shivaji Nagar to the North) are by foot, through the shanties of Sate Nagar to the South East. Direct road access to the site is cut off either by the canal system, the railway line or by large undeveloped plots. Ironically, even though a site approximately 300m North of Lallubhai compound has been selected for a Fire Brigade Command Centre, because of inaccessibility, fire trucks would not have direct road access into the Compound.



*Lallubhai Compound - S.V. Patel Buildings*

Most residents of the inner buildings interviewed were acutely aware of this – one respondent said “...how will they save us? We will simply burn!”, while another family was concerned that their old mother, who is alone at home for most of the day, would not be able to run down the steps quickly enough to escape. One community leader pointed out that the compound only gets seven minutes of water per day, so there is no question of having fire hydrants built in the area. The local police have also voiced similar concerns about safety services not being able to reach the inner buildings during an emergency. A local constable remarked “I don’t think they can expect us to go in there in case of a fire... we will not be able to get in or out.”

Another major design and layout shortcoming is that the close grouping of the 19 S.V. Patel buildings means that the lower floors (upto the 5<sup>th</sup> floor in the inner buildings) get minimal daylight. GIS aided population density calculations reveal a project density of approximately 720,000 people per sq.km. The inner-buildings need to have 24 hour lighting in the hallways, otherwise they are in near total darkness all day. During some of the interview sessions conducted at mid-day in the inner buildings, flashlights were needed to read and fill out the questionnaire. This design shortcoming has created a dark ‘un-defensible’ space, a problem which is further elaborated upon in point 4.

## ***2. Relocation, unemployment and vulnerability***

The major reason for the flourishing of informal settlements within urban environments is that they provide quick and easy access to employment (UN-HABITAT 2007). This employment is primarily informal, although some are employed in the formalised sector. This closeness to work

which inner city informal settlements offer is broken during and after relocation. Amongst the communities which were relocated in relation to the MUTP and the MUIP, two particular types of livelihoods form particularly good examples to illustrate this:

A number of relocated families derived income from making street snacks (like vada-pau, boiled egg and other fried foods) for office goers. This income is very dependant on location since a vast majority of customers were office goers who picked up snacks on their way to work. As described earlier, the Mankhurd resettlement site is not well connected and so does not experience any through traffic from or to the Mankhurd station. One of the respondent households interviewed narrated how they have not been able to restart their snack-business in the resettlement site – “we used to sell off everything in one day. Now we cannot even manage to sell a few pakoras. Who will buy from us here? Travelling to the central station also doesn’t work, how will I pack up and take this stall around on my own shoulders?”

Another group adversely affected by the relocation is of those occupied in the provision of domestic services. More so than in the first example, the women (as maids) and men (as handy men, car washers, or cleaners) employed in the domestic service provision sector are heavily dependant on being close to their place of employment. Women rely on servicing several households in quick succession to be able to return home to look after their own children and carry out housework. On days they are ill or can not work, they rely on other women from their community to fill in. Most households that employ domestic help also require that they live in close proximity so that they can be called upon for odd tasks. Several

relocated families who depended on this type of employment prior to relocation, have totally been cut off from employment, and more poignantly, given that there are very few prospective employer-households within walking distance of the relocation site, these families have been unable to find continued employment post-resettlement.

### ***3. Lost years of schooling and unavailability of healthcare***

Relocation has also adversely affected education and schooling of children from PAHs. Most PAHs benefited from NGO or public schools near their informal settlements and so there was a high attendance rate amongst children. However, since these schools were not relocated with the communities<sup>3</sup> and there are no schools with available space in the vicinity, there was a very high drop out rate amongst children of PAHs. Furthermore, because the relocation and resettlement process has been protracted, with some families living in transit camps for close to nine years now, many children have been out of school for so long that they are finding it extremely difficult to rejoin. Many of these children are now already involved in trying to secure income or in housework. Poignantly, the relocation has affected girl children more severely in this regard - most PAHs resist sending their daughters to far off schools unless there is an escort (c.f. Contractor 2008).

Studies have also shown that such relocation and resettlement have adverse effects on several health indicators, and that these effects are more acute amongst women and girl children (Contractor 2008). Women experienced a shortage of basic health care, leading to a heightened prevalence of chronic illness. Healthcare provision during pregnancy and post-natal was also

adversely affected. As Contractor points out, "The absence of public health facilities and the physical inaccessibility of the resettlement colony add to the costs of treatment and can impact health risks. Even a seemingly routine event such as a pregnancy could raise difficulties resulting in women being deprived of the most basic and essential healthcare putting them under tremendous risk. A factor that influenced access to health services was familiarity and trust. Familiar health services ensured they are better accessed. Also negative attitudes of healthcare providers in existing health facilities nearby towards resettled communities emerged as a reason why women preferred not to go long distances because of the fear of being discriminated against or abused. This was preferred even if it took greater effort in terms of time, travel and money to go all the way to Jari Mari. Owing to their subordinate status,



*Gated pathways, Lallubhai Compound- S.V. Patel Buildings*

women are burdened with caring for the health of their household members and women's own health needs take a back seat to the extent of being ignored. Therefore there is a need for policy-makers and public administrators to take cognisance of the special needs of women in cases of involuntary resettlement within the urban context so that the marginalised are not further sidelined, or rather ignored, within the larger development agenda" (Contractor 2008: 162).

Both of these are particularly poignant since they constitute an inter-generational transmission of poverty and vulnerability. That is, instead of helping to lift PAHs out of their vulnerable circumstances, the resettlement schemes is putting not only the current generation into vulnerable circumstances, but also the next generation.

#### **4. Non-cognizable crime and the breaking down of informal systems**

This issue brought up earlier in the discussion on police accessibility during emergency situations, like in the instance of a fire, is more wide reaching. There is a very high prevalence of petty crime in the Lallubhai compound, including purse and chain snatching, paint sniffing and stealing from windows, and a fast growing prevalence of more serious crimes, including knife crime, gang related crimes, drug pedalling and usage. Some residents originally believed that this crime was being "brought in" by criminal elements from neighbouring shanty settlements, and so have erected iron gates in some of the inner pathways of the compound (see image 1). These gates are lockable, the keys to which are held by some members of the buildings' housing societies. However, focus group discussions amongst community members reveals that crime is being endogenised -

that is, currently most offenders live in the compound. Non-cognizable crimes<sup>4</sup>, such as neighbour disputes, community quarrels, are issues of design as well as policy.

In terms of design, the narrow pathways between the block of 19 S.V. Patel buildings only allow minimal sunlight in. Since no windows open out into the side pathways, ventilation is also a major concern. This has created dark 'un-defensible' space (as opposed to 'defensible' space in Newman 1973) which some residents described as "highways of crime". The layout of the pathways (as seen in Map 2) is also such that it does not foster any ownership of space amongst residents. To the contrary, residents often voice fear of these spaces – a group of school children interviewed revealed that "...we are scared coming home from school through here [a back pathway]. I usually just run through to



*image 1 - Dark pathways, Lallubhai Compound-S.V. Patel Building (photo taken at 2pm)*



get to my building". In this regard, there has also been a policy failure in that the resettlement exercise has built a high concentration of poverty and vulnerability in the Lallubhai Compound. Over the years, several studies from around the world have highlighted the destructive potential of creating such areas of concentrated poverty and vulnerability (like for example Poyner 1983; Rainwater 2006). FGDs and semi-structured interviewing amongst young adults (15- 35 years) resident in the S.V. Patel buildings reveals that criminality is becoming pervasive into the social networks. Those boys who are involved in petty crime, particularly paint and tip-ex sniffing, have started to form loose gangs. That is, gang like behaviour is beginning to be found in their social interactions. One group of boys said that they "...keep watch over their friends... they will help me when I need

it". Moreover, the pervasiveness of criminal behaviour is also becoming self-reinforcing. The more violent boys seem to be looked up to within their group, and violent and criminal behaviour is beginning to be respected – one respondent said "X is so powerful, no one can touch him. He threw a bottle at the hawaladar and they couldn't do anything. X knows all the hiding places in the compound...X can be a leader..."

Here, design and implementation failure of the resettlement scheme can be seen to have direct impact on criminality. A telling example of this was narrated by another respondent who described his predicament in buying water for the house: "In these buildings we only get 7 minutes of water in a day... we don't have enough money for pump and tank... so I have to buy water. Y (another boy in the group) also buys water



*Garbage disposed from REAR windows*

from the same people I do, but Y knows them well and helps them out (supposedly with carrying out petty crime in the neighbourhood), so he gets water easily". The failure in providing running water round-the-clock, as was required by the original project plans, can be seen to necessitate the reliance on informal and criminal networks.

Another example similarly showcasing how implementation failure leads to conflict is the issue of garbage collection. Household waste and garbage is supposed to be collected from each house. However, for some reason the municipality or the building housing committees have not been able to deliver effective collection services. The problem is most severe in the buildings at the Eastern edge of the block, where resident on the outer-upper floors simply dispose garbage and household waste from their windows.

This affects the residents of the ground floor most severely since their kitchen and living room windows open out to where the garbage is being disposed. One ground floor resident was visibly disturbed when describing to me how exasperated he and his family were getting with the smell of garbage outside their window. "For namaz we have to be clean, I step out and something gets thrown on me. Behind the building, the whole day there is smell of rotten garbage, and these people [residents of upper floors] keep throwing garbage without caring for us. Earlier [in their informal settlement from which they were relocated] everyone was responsible for keeping our jhopaddis clean, but now how can I know who throws garbage?!" Given the spatial nature of the point of conflict, there is no way for lower floor residents to know who is throwing the garbage and so there have often been altercations between residents. The

'front-door-principle', that is, everyone is responsible for the area outside their front door, worked in keeping the informal settlements clean since the shanties had only one or two floors. This informal network was broken when the community was shifted to multi-storeyed towers.

### **Policy considerations for slum resettlement: focus on sustainability**

This research has aimed to evaluate security provisioning in slum resettlement schemes linked with the MUTP and the MUIP. The study conceptualises security as something broader than simply the provision of legal tenure to a permanent living space. On the contrary, security is understood as the mitigation of a multi-layered vulnerability, including asset, income, and physical vulnerability, as well as protection by and from the law.

Several design, implementation, and policy shortcomings, particularly in terms of security provision in the resettlement exercise, have been highlighted above. The lessons which can be learned from studying these issues can be broken into two major strands – the first pertains to design considerations, and the second looks at detailed policy considerations of the resettlement exercise.



*Current layout, Lallubhai Compound.*

## Design considerations


### ***Building incentives versus over crowding***

At the design level, the basic planning of the site needs to be concertedly rethought if such resettlement sites are to be developed in the future. At this basic level there are some inconsistencies in the provision of development incentives, Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) through Floor Space Index (FSI) provisions for builders, since the scheme's budgeting allocates a substantial amount for building the resettlement site. While it is true that SRA guidelines provide incentives for building resettlement sites, these policies however neglect the multi-dimensionality of urban vulnerability. When the resettlement scheme includes a budget for site building, action needs to be taken to ensure that competitive (i.e. un-incentivised) bidding takes place for building contracts. It is clearly seen that because very high levels of FSI aided TDRs were made available, the Mankhurd site is grossly over-crowded. With a projected population density of 720,000 people per sq. km. the site could have easily done with a more spread out site plan. This is particularly relevant since there is open space surrounding the site (see Maps 1 and 2) which could have been incorporated into the plan for the buildings. Future resettlement schemes

need to also consider whether private sector involvement in the relocation is necessarily positive. In slum resettlement, the rights and responsibilities structure between the State and its citizens is such that it needs to be considered whether the solution should be limited by market forces alone.

Furthermore, the dark 'un-defensible' spaces created between buildings and in the dark hallways could have been countered by employing basic thinking around community friendly planning. It is now widely accepted that creating low-income-high-vulnerability concentration zones is extremely detrimental to social and economic development (for example, the failure of the United States Housing Act of 1949 as described in Bristol 1991). Importantly, such ideas are not new, dating back to the 1970s and 1980s (see for example Correa 1989). As seen in the GIS map below, rudimentary modelling can reveal more community friendly planning. Poignantly, the Hiranandani buildings across the road from the S.V. Patel buildings show a more community friendly layout.

However, many tenements in these buildings lie vacant, and the central courtyard spaces have large water tanks protruding from the ground, making the space unusable for community activities.



*Lallubhai Compound using Charles Correa's low-income housing designs.*



*Site selection principles.*

### ***Site selection and access***

Site selection also needs to be rethought – and this is particularly relevant since on paper there was a stringent 20-point selection system in place. However, as showcased in the sections above, the site finally selected falls short primarily in terms of access. There are no direct routes to the train station and no arterial thoroughfares. This problem of access was not taken into account in site planning. The IBRD inspection panel found that “the suitability of the Mankhurd resettlement site is supported by an environmental analysis [and] living conditions at Mankhurd are expected to be considerably better than conditions [in the slums from where the communities were relocated]... Of the total area, fifteen percent is reserved for recreation, of which a substantial part will be landscaped. This will include green lawns and trees planted along the banks of the drain, which will reduce its visibility from the buildings. Flowering trees with a large canopy when mature will be preferred for planting. A retaining wall will be constructed along the banks of the drain to define the boundary and other actions will be taken to prevent erosion...” (IBRD Inspection Panel 2004: Annex 1, pp. 23). When this study was conducted, none of this proposed landscape work had been undertaken.

### ***Policy considerations***

#### ***Police as stakeholders***

The issues of criminal behaviour, physical vulnerability and the break down of law and order which have arisen at the Lallubhai compound make it necessary for any future slum resettlement schemes to explicitly consider how vulnerability mitigation might be directly included in resettlement scheme. One major policy shortcoming in the MUDP/MUIP resettlement exercise is that the framework entirely excludes the

city police from being understood not only as a government institution responsible for vulnerability mitigation, but also, as a joint stakeholder in the process of slum relocation and resettlement. At the very basic level, the city police are necessarily involved in any law and order concerns, but over and above that, they are also an integral part of any city’s development, and therefore share in its successes and failures. Contrary to this understanding of the police as agents for urban development, the resettlement process involves the police at three distinct stages: firstly, the police are brought in during slum demolition or clearance to help move any households that may be reluctant to move. Secondly, the police are asked to maintain law and order in transit camps. And lastly, the police are made responsible to maintain law and order in the final resettlement site, once the relocation has been completed.

These interjections by their nature are extremely violent interjections – in the least, eviction is a very emotive and distressing experience, while transit camps are sites of heavy contestation for often limited resources. By the time the police are called in, these situations are often already tense, and therefore the police are necessarily seen as agents of state aggression or oppression. FGDs and interviews with residents at the Lallubhai Compound reveal very similar experiences.

One resident pointed out that “nobody here trusts the police, how can we?”, while another family described that “at every stage of the relocation we were faced with different [police] people, earlier [in the slum] we had one group of constables, then some other people at the transit camps, and now I don’t even know who our local constables are...”



This kind of police involvement made at highly distressing points of time is therefore perceived as aggressive, leading to grave mistrust between the police and citizens, and works directly against the model of 'slum panchayats' (as described in Roy, Jaiswal, and Bharti 2007; Roy, Jockin, and Javed 2004), community policing or the Mohalla Committee Movement, which the Mumbai Police have been working to instate.

Instead, slum resettlement schemes need to consider supporting a community policing model which fosters equal partnerships between the community and the police. Community Relations Officers (CROs) – members of the police force who are directly responsible for, and responsible to, particular groups of PAHs – could be put in place before any relocation exercise, and maintained till the relocation has been completed. That is, the jurisdiction of the CRO is transferred as the PAHs are relocated, and finally, the CRO builds a rapport between the PAHs and the police station in the relocation site.

Because this kind of equal partnerships process has the entire relocation process built into its timeline, there is a much higher incentive for all stakeholders to build trust between each other.

### ***Income generation and skills transfer***

While there has been concerted effort on the part of NGOs (like SPARC, Mahila Milan, NSDF) to provide rehabilitation of employment, like the provision of train passes for travel, measures to counter income vulnerability should have been reflected in the original resettlement scheme. To ensure that resettled populations are not isolated, at a design level, the resettlement scheme should have aimed for a mixed-income approach, which

breaks down some of the barriers caused by the high concentration of poverty and vulnerability, and the site selection should have also reflected a greater connectivity with the rest of the city. At a policy level, long-term focussed skills transfer programs to reorient displaced communities into new livelihood approaches should have been included as essential program objectives to ensure that income generation can be sustainable. This implies that security is equated with the employment and livelihood security, physical safety, as well as with the provision of legal tenure to a secure and permanent living space.

### ***Best practices, data and implementation***

The CRO or other similar models which foster trust building between the state and its citizens require adequate prioritisation and funding. Currently, the Mumbai police are under funded and under staffed, and there is space for specific resettlement related training for police staff. Furthermore, effective local planning and management can only be made through access to adequate geo-spatial data (Mason, Baltsavias, and Bishop 1997). This kind of data must be made available to the academic, policy and civic community, so that informed and participatory opinions can be garnered from all sections.

### ***Conclusion<sup>5</sup>***

The findings of this study, and corroborated by several other studies, highlight several issues of major concern. These include concerns over physical safety and security arising out of design, layout and access failures, concerns of unemployment, unavailability of healthcare and education, as well as high prevalence of non-cognizable and petty crime. Slum redevelopment, resettlement and rehabilitation policies in India, and in Maharashtra and Mumbai in



particular, have a long history. On paper and in principle they are very forward thinking, inclusive and equitable (as seen by the SRA process flowchart in appendix). However, given the complexity and enormity of the task, a monotonous approach to slum eradication which aims to implement the same solution for all relocation exercises, can only fail. As argued by Mukhija, “the complexities involved in [providing incentives for] the provision of housing...focuses on the ability of the private sector, specifically the “markets,” to deliver housing. [This] has been promoted as consisting of, primarily, decentralisation, privatisation, deregulation and demand-driven development. The focus of the policy prescriptions is to reduce the “damaging” involvement of the State... [However], enabling housing provision through market mechanisms may require four levels of seeming policy contradictions – both decentralisation and centralisation; privatisation and public investment; deregulation and new regulations, and demand-driven and supply-driven development” (*Mukhija 2001*). In sum that is, the issue of slum redevelopment and resettlement continues to be complex, and requires a more sophisticated and rethought role of the State. The incentivised private-sector lead solution to slum redevelopment has not resulted in a sustainable solution

for slum resettlement in Mumbai because it is aimed only at providing PAHs legal tenure to their living space. Other important aspects of urban vulnerability, including physical insecurity, rising levels of non-cognizable and cognizable crime in the resettlement sites, and other income and consumption related vulnerabilities, have been by and large neglected. In particular, this study has highlighted that these issues arise either as a direct result of design shortcomings in the resettlement site, or in some instances as a result of failures in the slum resettlement policy framework.

There is therefore a need to rethink what it means to classify an area as a slum, that is, to re-examine what characteristics classify an area as such, as well as why and by whom any such classification is undertaken. Importantly, this study argues that while there is a multiplicity of ways in which a slum can be defined, depending in part on national or local standards, any such definition must necessarily include the recursive components of physical and asset vulnerability. Moreover, it needs to also be considered whether the design and policy concerns raised above make large scale resettlement exercises, which by their nature only cater to the provision of legal tenure, unviable for sustainable patterns of urban growth.

1. A composite of a disclosure by a household member of: not having a dispute settled by the police, or having been beaten by the police, not being able to afford legal assistance in dispute resolution, and not knowing any of the local police constables.
2. The categories to which merit points were assigned were: (i) distance from the proposed site to the nearest railway station by the existing accessible road; (ii) nature of access, such as a pedestrian, narrow street more or less than 20 feet, access from a proposed or existing vehicular road, etc.; (iii) availability of existing basic infrastructure (adequate infrastructure, site within municipal sewerage zone, etc.); (iv) site conditions such as levelled, fenced, etc.; and (v) size of the plot that can accommodate a minimum of 250 standard units of 225 sq. ft. For more information see Annexure 1 in IBRD Inspection Panel. 2004. Bank management response to request for Inspection Panel review of the India - Mumbai Urban Transport Project (IBRD Loan No. 4665-IN; IDA Credit No. 3662-IN). Washington, D. C.: IBRD, World Bank.
3. While the relocation of schools was planned, it was not undertaken till very recently.
4. As per the Indian Penal Code, in the instance of a non-cognizable offence, the Police cannot arrest a person without orders of the court, i.e. without a Court warrant and can investigate into the case only on the express directions of the court to that effect. Therefore, the experience is that in a non-cognizable offence the Police Station officer records the complaint as a non-cognizable offence, commonly referred to as a N.C., and advises the complainant or victim to approach the court for further directions.
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